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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
This is an appeal of the District Court's dismissal under 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) of conspiracy and concert of action 
claims alleged by thousands of plaintiffs in multidistrict 
litigation involving allegedly defective bone screw 
implantation devices. The District Court held the claims, 
insofar as they alleged a conspiracy to violate the Federal 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act ("FDCA"), 21 U.S.C.A. S 301- 
397 (West Supp. 1999), did not state a cause of action 
 
                                6 
  
upon which relief can be granted. Accordingly, the court 
granted defendants' motions to dismiss those claims. 
 
The District Court also made several rulings unfavorable 
to the defendants. The court denied with prejudice their 
motions to dismiss based on improper pleading and First 
Amendment protection. Additionally, the District Court 
denied the motions of several defendants for attorney's fees, 
costs, and sanctions. These rulings are now challenged on 
cross-appeal. 
 





This multidistrict litigation comprises more than 2,000 
civil actions originally filed in approximately sixty of the 
ninety-four federal districts. In August 1994, the cases were 
consolidated in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania under 
28 U.S.C. S 1407. All of the approximately 5,000 individual 
plaintiffs claim to have suffered physical injuries caused by 
defective orthopedic bone screw devices affixed to the 
pedicles of their spines during spinal fusion surgery. The 
devices, which are intended to stabilize the spine and 
achieve fusion of the vertebrae, consist of rods or plates 
that are screwed into the vertical axis of the lumbar spine. 
In most cases, plaintiffs allege the devices broke after being 
implanted in their spines. In some instances, plaintiffs have 
undergone surgery to have the devices removed; in others, 
the broken devices could not be removed. 
 
Plaintiffs' original claims, filed in early 1994, set forth 
causes of action based on both federal statutes and state 
law tort and contract principles. Generally, they named as 
defendants only the manufacturers and distributors of the 
bone screw devices. Subsequent actions named a broader 
array of defendants and stated additional theories of 
recovery. In particular, hundreds of so-called "omni" 
actions, first brought in October 1995, name as defendants 
the manufacturers, designers, and distributors of the 
devices; trade associations that conducted seminars on 
their use; regulatory consultants; and physicians who 
promoted the product. There are two types of omni actions. 
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The Plaintiffs' Legal Committee ("PLC") actions allege both a 
horizontal conspiracy involving manufacturers and a 
vertical conspiracy involving all of the defendants. The 
Lestelle actions (so named after the attorney who drafted 
the form complaint that served as the basis of these 
actions) allege only a horizontal conspiracy involving 
manufacturers. In addition to the conspiracy and concert of 
action claims, the omni complaints allege fraud; negligent 
misrepresentation; strict liability in tort; liability per se; 
negligence; breach of implied warranty of merchantibility; 
and (in some cases) loss of consortium. 
 
In August 1996, the District Court dismissed the PLC 
omni complaints in their entirety because the complaints 
failed to demonstrate subject matter jurisdiction. See In re 
Orthopedic Bone Screw Prods. Liability Litig., MDL No. 1014, 
1996 WL 482977 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 22, 1996) (Pretrial Order 
No. 477). The court also dismissed the conspiracy claims in 
both the PLC and the Lestelle complaints for failure to state 
a claim upon which relief could be granted, and it 
dismissed the fraud claims in the Lestelle complaints 
because the circumstances of fraud were not averred with 
sufficient particularity. See id. All of these dismissals were 
without prejudice. Plaintiffs subsequently filed hundreds of 
amended omni complaints, which are the subject of this 
appeal.1 
 
Twice before, we have issued decisions in this litigation. 
First, we denied the petitions of some defendants for a writ 
of mandamus invalidating the District Court's dismissal of 
the conspiracy and concert of action claims. See In re 
Orthopedic Bone Screw Prods. Liability Litig., No. 97-1426, 
1427, 1438, 1450, 1453, 1465, mem. op. (3d Cir. Nov. 10, 
1997) (unpublished opinion). There we considered two of 
the arguments raised by defendants here: their claim that 
the First Amendment prohibits imposition of liability for 
their speech at the seminars, and their contention that the 
omni complaints fail to plead reliance and causation 
adequately. Although these arguments did not persuade us 
to grant the "extraordinary remedy" of mandamus relief, In 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. For ease of reference, we will refer to the amended omni complaints 
simply as the "omni complaints." 
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re Asbestos Sch. Litig. (Pfizer Inc.), 46 F.3d 1284, 1288 (3d 
Cir. 1994), we noted that the standards governing a 
mandamus petition are more stringent than those 
governing a direct appeal, and that our disposition did not 
preclude defendants from asserting their arguments at a 
later stage in the proceedings. Accordingly, our denial of a 
writ of mandamus has no binding effect in the present 
appeal. More recently, we determined that plaintiffs' state 
law claims of fraud on the FDA were not preempted by the 
Medical Device Amendments of 1976, 21 U.S.C.A. SS 360c- 
360k (West Supp. 1999) ("MDA"). See In re Orthopedic Bone 
Screw Prods. Liability Litig., 159 F.3d 817 (3d Cir. 1998). 
 
A. Regulatory Framework 
 
The conspiracy and concert of action claims at issue here 
require some discussion of the regulatory framework 
governing orthopedic bone screw devices. It is undisputed 
that the devices are regulated by the FDCA, as amended by 
the MDA. At the time the lawsuits were filed, the FDA had 
classified the bone screw devices as "Class III" devices 
because they "present a potential unreasonable risk of 
illness or injury." 21 U.S.C. S 360c(a)(1)(C)(ii)(II). 
Consequently, one must receive "premarket approval" 
before commercially distributing or selling them. Id. 
S 360e(a). To obtain the data to support an application for 
premarket approval, a manufacturer may use the device in 
clinical trials under active FDA supervision pursuant to the 
FDCA's Investigational Device Exemption ("IDE") provisions 
and accompanying federal regulations. Id. S 360j(g); 21 
C.F.R. pt. 812 (1998). Premarket approval will be granted 
only if the IDE investigation proves the device is sufficiently 
safe and effective. 
 
Premarket approval is not required if the FDA determines 
the device is "substantially equivalent" to a legally marketed 
"predicate device" (that is, a device marketed before the 
Medical Device Amendments went into effect on May 28, 
1976) in terms of its intended use, technological 
characteristics, safety, and effectiveness. 21 U.S.C. 
S 360e(b)(1)(B); 21 C.F.R. S 807.100(b). A determination of 
substantial equivalence is called "510(k) clearance" in 
reference to the applicable section of the original Act. If a 
device obtains 510(k) clearance, it may be introduced into 
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commerce without premarket approval. Alternatively, the 
FDA may issue an order declaring the device "not 
substantially equivalent" ("NSE"), which means that it 
cannot be marketed without premarket approval. 
 
Thus, a person who wishes to market or sell a Class III 
device has two primary avenues of obtaining FDA approval: 
premarket approval, based on safety and efficacy data from 
non-clinical laboratory studies or IDE investigation; or 
510(k) clearance, based on a showing that the device is 
substantially equivalent to one that was in commerce prior 
to May 28, 1976.2 If a Class III medical device is introduced 
into commerce without one of these two approvals, it is 
deemed "adulterated" and the person who introduced the 
device into commerce is criminally liable. See 21 U.S.C. 
S 331(a). Similarly, it is a crime to introduce into commerce 
a Class III device that is "misbranded," meaning that it does 
not bear adequate directions for its intended use. See id. 
 
B. The Omni Complaints 
 
According to the omni complaints, in 1984 AcroMed 
Corporation -- and shortly thereafter, Sofamor, Inc. and 
other sellers and manufacturers -- sought 510(k) clearance 
to market pedicle screw devices. The FDA denied 510(k) 
clearance but approved a series of IDE clinical trials 
between 1986 and 1993. Because the trials failed to 
generate sufficient safety data, the FDA denied premarket 
approval after each one. Allegedly, defendants then 
conspired to market their bone screw devices without the 
necessary FDA approvals. 
 
The omni complaints allege two distinct conspiracies. The 
first is entitled, variously, the "Sofamor Conspiracy," the 
"ASFSI Conspiracy," or the "Danek Conspiracy," depending 
on the particular manufacturer being sued. It is alleged 
that the manufacturer entered into written agreements with 
spinal surgeons and other health care professionals in 
which the manufacturer agreed to provide them royalties 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Premarket approval is also not required upon a showing that the 
device in question was itself introduced into interstate commerce for 
commercial distribution before May 28, 1976. See  21 U.S.C. 
S 360e(b)(1)(A). 
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and stock options in exchange for their participation in 
"seminars" instructing physicians how to use the 
manufacturer's bone screw device. According to the 
complaints, although the seminars were conducted in the 
guise of educating fellow members of the medical 
profession, they were actually akin to "Tupperware parties" 
in that their true purpose was purely commercial. Plaintiffs 
also claim that the physicians who conducted the seminars 
did not disclose to attendees that the bone screw device 
had not received FDA premarket approval or 510(k) 
clearance for use in pedicle fixation surgery; that clinical 
trials had actually raised serious questions about its safety 
and efficacy; and that they, the physicians, had a direct 
financial stake in the sale of the device. 
 
The complaints also describe an "Intercompany/ 
Association Conspiracy." Under this theory, plaintiffs claim 
that manufacturers of the bone screw devices paid various 
professional associations to sponsor and conduct seminars 
for orthopedic surgeons. The purpose of the seminars, 
again, was to promote the use of orthopedic bone screws in 
surgery. At the seminars, the Intercompany/Association 
conspirators allegedly concealed the same basic facts as in 
the first conspiracy: namely, that the FDA had not 
approved the use of the devices in pedicle fixation surgery; 
that studies had raised serious doubts about the safety of 
using the devices in such a procedure; and that the 
associations were being paid by the manufacturers to 
promote the devices. Later, the Intercompany/Association 
conspirators allegedly implemented a two-part scheme to 
avoid civil and criminal liability for these activities. First, 
they established a trade association known as the"Spinal 
Implant Manufacturers Group" to conduct a retrospective 
study (the "Cohort Study") of pedicle screwfixation. The 
results of the Cohort Study were reported to the FDA and 
published in Spine magazine in October 1994, allegedly to 
achieve reclassification of the bone screw device as a Class 
I or II device (obviating the need for premarket approval) 
and to serve as a defense in potential criminal or civil 
litigation.3 According to plaintiffs, the Cohort study was an 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. In July 1998, the FDA reclassified most pedicle screw fixation devices 
as Class II devices. See Orthopedic Devices: Classification and 
Reclassification of Pedicle Screw Spinal Systems, 63 Fed. Reg. 40,025 
(1998) (codified at 21 C.F.R. S 888.3070). 
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intentional fraud, relying on selective data and ignoring 
unfavorable results. Second, defendants Danek and 
AcroMed allegedly agreed to mislead the FDA into believing 
Zimmer4 had marketed a bone screw device for pedicle 
fixation surgery in the United States before 1976, in an 
attempt to obtain 510(K) clearance on the ground that the 
bone screw device was "substantially equivalent" to a 
predicate device. 
 
C. District Court Proceedings 
 
The District Court determined that although the two 
conspiracies outlined in the omni complaints differ in some 
respects, both essentially allege that defendants agreed to a 
scheme to market and sell bone screw devices without the 
necessary FDA approvals. See In re Orthopedic Bone Screw 
Prods. Liability Litig., MDL No. 1014, Pretrial Order No. 861, 
mem. op. at 18 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 16, 1997) [hereinafter "PTO 
861"] (noting that each conspiracy "had the same single 
objective: to promote and sell pedicle screw fixation devices 
in violation of the FDCA").5 The court held the claims failed 
to state a cause of action upon which relief could be 
granted, see id. at 27, because civil conspiracy and concert 
of action claims require an independent basis of tort 
liability, which the FDCA does not provide. In accordance 
with this ruling, the Judicial Panel for Multidistrict 
Litigation began to remand all actions containing a claim of 
conspiracy to violate the FDCA to transferor courts for 
summary judgment proceedings and trial. Numerous 
transferor courts have granted summary judgment for 
defendants on such claims, concluding that PTO 861 is the 
law of the case on that issue. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Zimmer, Inc., a manufacturer of the pedicle screw device, initially was 
included as a defendant in the Intercompany/Association Conspiracy 
claim brought by PLC. PLC and Zimmer have since settled their 
respective claims against each other. 
 
5. In addition, the omni complaints alleged that defendants conspired to 
commit fraud by actively concealing material facts at the seminars. After 
PTO 861 was entered, however, plaintiffs moved for voluntary dismissal 
with prejudice of their conspiracy to defraud claims, which the District 
Court granted. See In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Prods. Liability Litig., 
MDL 1014, Memorandum and Pretrial Order No. 1543, op. at 6 (E.D. Pa. 
Aug. 13, 1998). 
 
                                12 
  
Also in PTO 861, the District Court denied defendants' 
motion to dismiss all claims premised upon their speech at 
the seminars. Defendants had argued that such speech is 
protected by the First Amendment and therefore cannot be 
the basis for imposing civil liability. The District Court 
rejected this argument, holding that the complaints allege 
false and misleading commercial speech, which does not 
qualify for First Amendment protection. The court also 
declined to dismiss plaintiffs' claims on the basis that they 
failed to plead reliance and causation adequately, and it 
denied the motions of several defendants -- the American 
Academy of Orthopedic Surgeons, the Scoliosis Research 
Society, and the North American Spine Society -- for 
attorney's fees and sanctions under 28 U.S.C. S 1927, Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 54(d), and the court's inherent powers. 
 
Because there is complete diversity of all plaintiffs and 
defendants, the District Court had jurisdiction over each 
civil action under 28 U.S.C. S 1332. In In re Orthopedic 
Bone Screw Prods. Liability Litig., MDL 1014, Memorandum 
and Pretrial Order No. 1543, (E.D. Pa. Aug. 13, 1998), the 
District Court issued certification for final judgment under 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) on all of plaintiffs' conspiracy and 
concert of action allegations and complaints encompassed 
in MDL No. 1014. Therefore, we have jurisdiction under 28 




A. Dismissal of the Conspiracy and Concert of Action 
       Claims 
 
We first address the dismissal of plaintiffs' conspiracy 
and concert of action claims. This ruling was premised 
upon the District Court's determination that civil 
conspiracy does not provide a right of action in the absence 
of an underlying tort; rather, it "renders each conspirator 
vicariously liable for the commission of an act that is 
independently actionable under state law and is in 
furtherance of the conspiracy." PTO 861, at 23. Therefore, 
the court held that plaintiffs' claims failed to state a cause 
of action upon which relief could be granted. See id. at 25. 
We exercise plenary review of this conclusion. See 
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Steamfitters Local Union No. 420 v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 171 
F.3d 912, 919 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 
No federal court of appeals has addressed the legal 
cognizability of a claim for conspiracy to violate the FDCA.6 
It is well settled, however, that the FDCA creates no private 
right of action. See 21 U.S.C. S 337(a) (restricting FDCA 
enforcement to suits by the United States); In re Orthopedic 
Bone Screw Prods. Liability Litig., 159 F.3d 817, 824 (3d 
Cir. 1998) ("It is . . . well established that Congress has not 
created an express or implied private cause of action for 
violations of the FDCA or the MDA."); PDK Labs., Inc. v. 
Friedlander, 103 F.3d 1105, 1113 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding 
that plaintiff 's suit "represents an impermissible attempt to 
enforce the FDCA through a private right of action"); Mylan 
Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1139 (4th Cir. 1993) 
(same). The question, then, is whether violation of a federal 
statute imposing criminal penalties but establishing no 
private right of action may serve as a basis for civil recovery 
under state conspiracy law. 
 
The established rule is that a cause of action for civil 
conspiracy requires a separate underlying tort as a 
predicate for liability. Thus, one cannot sue a group of 
defendants for conspiring to engage in conduct that would 
not be actionable against an individual defendant. Instead, 
" `actionable civil conspiracy must be based on an existing 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. In addition to the District Court here, one other federal district 
court 
has addressed the issue: 
 
       [A] conspiracy is only actionable if the acts in question, when 
       committed by a single person, would also be actionable. Defendant 
       . . . alleges that the acts complained of in count II are simply 
       violations of the FDCA, the act which comprehensively regulates the 
       marketing of prescription drugs in the United States, and that the 
       FDCA does not create a private right of action for enforcement by 
       private individuals such as plaintiffs. 
 
       To the extent that plaintiffs were attempting to assert a cause of 
       action under the FDCA, defendant would be correct. 
 
Hawkins v. Upjohn Co., 890 F. Supp. 609, 611 (E.D. Tex. 1994) (applying 
Texas law). The Hawkins court found that plaintiffs' complaint, though 
poorly worded, actually alleged a conspiracy to commit fraud and 
therefore was independently actionable under state law. See id. 
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independent wrong or tort that would constitute a valid 
cause of action if committed by one actor.' " Posner v. Essex 
Ins. Co., 178 F.3d 1209, 1218 (11th Cir. 1999) (quoting 
Williams Elec. Co. v. Honeywell, Inc., 772 F. Supp. 1225, 
1239 (N.D. Fla. 1991)) (applying Florida law); accord Applied 
Equip. Corp. v. Litton Saudi Arabia Ltd., 869 P.2d 454, 457 
(Cal. 1994) ("Standing alone, a conspiracy does no harm 
and engenders no tort liability. It must be activated by the 
commission of an actual tort."); Stoldt v. City of Toronto, 
678 P.2d 153, 161 (Kan. 1984) ("Conspiracy is not 
actionable without commission of some wrong giving rise to 
a cause of action independent of the conspiracy."); Alleco, 
Inc. v. Harry & Jeanette Weinberg Found., Inc., 665 A.2d 
1038, 1045 (Md. 1995) ("No action in tort lies for conspiracy 
to do something unless the acts actually done, if done by 
one person, would constitute a tort.") (citation omitted); 
Alexander & Alexander of N.Y., Inc. v. Fritzen, 503 N.E.2d 
102, 102-03 (N.Y. 1986) ("[A] mere conspiracy to commit a 
tort is never of itself a cause of action. Allegations of 
conspiracy are permitted only to connect the actions of 
separate defendants with an otherwise actionable tort.") 
(citations omitted). 
 
Because this multidistrict litigation implicates the state 
law of many different jurisdictions, we have reviewed the 
law of every applicable jurisdiction on this point. Having 
done so, we are unaware of any jurisdiction that recognizes 
civil conspiracy as a cause of action requiring no separate 
tortious conduct. To the contrary, the law uniformly 
requires that conspiracy claims be predicated upon an 
underlying tort that would be independently actionable 
against a single defendant.7 Because plaintiffs here could 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. See, e.g., Hanten v. School Dist. of Riverview Gardens, 183 F.3d 799, 
809 (8th Cir. 1999) ("[A] claim of civil conspiracy `does not set forth an 
independent cause of action but rather is sustainable only after an 
underlying tort claim has been established . . . .' " (quoting K & S 
Partnership v. Continental Bank, N.A., 952 F.2d 971, 980 (8th Cir. 1991)) 
(applying Missouri law); Gaming Corp. of America v. Dorsey & Whitney, 
88 F.3d 536, 551 (8th Cir. 1996) ("[C]onspiracy is based on the 
commission of an underlying tort.") (applying Minnesota law); Halberstam 
v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 479 (D.C. Cir.1983) ("Since liability for civil 
conspiracy depends on performance of some underlying tortious act, the 
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not sue an individual defendant for an alleged violation of 
the FDCA, it follows that they cannot invoke the mantle of 
conspiracy to pursue the same cause of action against a 
group of defendants. A claim of civil conspiracy cannot rest 
solely upon the violation of a federal statute for which there 
is no corresponding private right of action. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
conspiracy is not independently actionable; rather, it is a means for 
establishing vicarious liability for the underlying tort.") (applying 
District 
of Columbia law); Cunningham v. PFL Life Ins. Co., 42 F. Supp.2d 872, 
884 (N.D. Iowa 1999) ("[C]onspiracy does not state an independent cause 
of action, but rather requires the commission of an underlying wrong for 
which liability may be extended to an additional defendant by virtue of 
a conspiracy.") (applying Iowa law); University Sys. of N.H. v. United 
States Gypsum Co., 756 F. Supp. 640, 652 (D.N.H. 1991) ("For a civil 
conspiracy to exist, there must be an underlying tort which the alleged 
conspirators agreed to commit. Conspiracy, then, serves as a device 
through which vicarious liability for the underlying tort may be imposed 
on all who commonly plan, take part in, further by cooperation, lend aid 
to, or encourage the wrongdoers' acts.") (applying New Hampshire law); 
In re North Dakota Personal Injury Asbestos Litig. No. 1, 737 F. Supp. 
1087, 1095 (D.N.D. 1990) ("One of the parties must commit some act in 
pursuance of the agreement that is itself a tort for civil conspiracy to 
exist.") (applying North Dakota law); McGlasson v. Barger, 431 P.2d 778, 
780 (Colo. 1967) ("[U]nless a civil action in damages would lie against 
one of the conspirators, if the act was done by him alone, it will not lie 
against many acting in concert.") (quoting Pullen v. Headberg, 127 P. 
954, 955 (Colo. 1912)); O'Neal v. Home Town Bank of Villa Rica, 514 
S.E.2d 669, 675 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999) ("Absent the underlying tort, there 
can be no liability for civil conspiracy."); Cohen v. Bowdoin, 288 A.2d 
106 
(Me. 1972) (" `[C]onspiracy' fails as the basis for the imposition of 
civil 
liability absent the actual commission of some independently recognized 
tort; and when such separate tort has been committed, it is that tort, 
and not the fact of combination, which is the foundation of the civil 
liability."); Admiral Ins. Co. v. Columbia Casualty Ins. Co., 486 N.W.2d 
351, 359 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992) ("Because [plaintiff] has failed to state 
any tortious action, its conspiracy action must also fail."); Middlesex 
Concrete Prods. & Excavating Corp. v. Carteret Indus. Ass'n, 181 A.2d 
774, 779 (N.J. 1962) ("[A] conspiracy cannot be made the subject of a 
civil action unless something has been done which, absent the 
conspiracy, would give a right of action."); Nix v. Temple Univ., 596 A.2d 
1132, 1137 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (" `Absent a civil cause of action for a 
particular act, there can be no cause of action for civil conspiracy.' ") 
(quoting Pelagatti v. Cohen, 536 A.2d 1337, 1342 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987)). 
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Plaintiffs contend the doctrine of per se liability (often 
called "negligence per se") establishes that violations of 
federal statutes can be the basis of common law tort liability.8 
They cite the following passage from the Restatement of 
Torts: 
 
       Even where a legislative enactment contains no express 
       provision that its violation shall result in tort liability, 
       and no implication to that effect, the court may, and in 
       certain types of cases customarily will, adopt the 
       requirements of the enactment as the standard of 
       conduct necessary to avoid liability for negligence. The 
       same is true of municipal ordinances and 
       administrative regulations. 
 
Restatement (Second) of Torts S 285 cmt. c (1977). In 
addition, plaintiffs rely on numerous cases in which courts, 
in determining common law tort liability, have considered 
whether the defendant's conduct violated federal law. See, 
e.g., Stanton ex rel. Brooks v. Astra Pharmaceutical Prods., 
Inc., 718 F.2d 553, 565 (3d Cir. 1983) (holding that failure 
to comply with FDA regulations constituted negligence per 
se under Pennsylvania law); Orthopedic Equip. Co. v. 
Eutsler, 276 F.2d 455, 461 (4th Cir. 1960) ("[W]e think that 
a violation of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act is 
negligence per se in Virginia . . . ."). 
 
In these and many other cases, courts have found that 
violations of a federal statute or regulations constituted 
negligence per se under state law. But the cases make clear 
the doctrine of per se liability does not create an 
independent basis of tort liability but rather establishes, by 
reference to a statutory scheme, the standard of care 
appropriate to the underlying tort. See, e.g. , Grove Fresh 
Distribs., Inc. v. Flavor Fresh Foods, Inc., 720 F. Supp. 714, 
716 (N.D. Ill. 1989) ("Grove Fresh relies on the FDA 
regulation merely to establish the standard or duty which 
defendants allegedly failed to meet. Nothing prohibits Grove 
Fresh from using the FDCA or its accompanying 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. The phrase "per se liability" is used primarily in the antitrust 
context, 
in which horizontal price-fixing arrangements are held to violate the 
Sherman Act regardless of their reasonableness. See FTC v. Superior Ct. 
Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411, 435 (1990); United States v. Socony- 
Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 225-26 n.59 (1940). 
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regulations in that fashion."). Liability per se enables 
plaintiffs to establish as a matter of law that the 
defendant's conduct constituted a breach of duty in a 
negligence action, so that only causation and damages need 
be proved. See In re TMI, 67 F.3d 1103, 1118 (3d Cir. 1995) 
("[W]here defendants violated the relevant statute or 
regulation, courts have held as a matter of law that 
plaintiffs have satisfied the first two elements of their cause 
of action: the duty and breach of duty."); Stanton, 718 F.2d 
at 564 n.22 (noting, in the FDCA context, that 
"Pennsylvania law views a statutory violation as conclusive 
evidence of negligence, in the absence of an excuse for that 
violation . . . . We emphasize, however, that the 
nomenclature `negligence per se' does not mean that a 
plaintiff seeking to recover under that doctrine may 
dispense with establishing proximate cause."). See generally 
1 J.D. Lee & Barry A. Lindahl, Modern Tort Law: Liability 
& Litigation S 3.33, at 102 (1980) ("Under the per se rule, 
the violation of an applicable statute is conclusive proof of 
negligence, leaving only the question of causation to be 
determined.") (citation omitted). 
 
The theory of per se liability advanced by the plaintiffs 
here is quite different. Plaintiffs do not invoke the statutory 
violations to prove defendants' liability for a separate 
underlying tort, but instead contend the violations 
themselves form a cause of action. This interpretation of 
per se liability would allow private plaintiffs to recover for 
violations of a federal statute that creates no private cause 
of action and, in fact, expressly restricts its enforcement to 
the federal government. See 21 U.S.C.A.S 337(a) (West 
Supp. 1999).9 Plaintiffs' theory would undermine section 
337(a) by establishing a private, state-law cause of action 
for violations of the FDCA, so long as those actions are 
brought against more than one defendant. We do not 
believe the concept of per se liability supports such a 
result. 
 
Nor are we persuaded by plaintiffs' argument that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. The statute also permits state governments to bring suit in certain 
limited circumstances, but only upon approval by the Secretary of 
Health and Human Services. See id. S 337(b). 
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Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996) and In re 
Orthopedic Bone Screw Prods. Liability Litig., 159 F.3d 817 
(3d Cir. 1998) (Bone Screw I) dictate reversal of the District 
Court. In Medtronic, the Supreme Court held the Medical 
Device Amendments ("MDA") do not preempt state common 
law negligence claims against manufacturers of defective 
medical devices. The Court observed that interpretation of 
a preemption provision does not occur in a "contextual 
vacuum," 518 U.S. at 485, but must be informed by two 
additional considerations: (1) the presumption against 
preemption unless clearly and manifestly indicated by 
Congress; and (2) the principle that "the purpose of 
Congress is the ultimate touchstone" in determining the 
extent of preemption. Id. Finding that Congress did not 
intend the MDA to foreclose state-law negligence lawsuits, 
the Court allowed plaintiffs' claims to proceed. 
 
In Bone Screw I, we interpreted Medtronic to mean that 
common law claims of fraudulent misrepresentation are not 
preempted by the MDA, even if the conduct underlying 
those claims violated the FDCA. See 159 F.3d at 825 
(holding that Medtronic "overrules everything in [Michael v. 
Shiley, Inc., 46 F.3d 1316 (3d Cir. 1995)] that would 
prevent a plaintiff from pursuing a cause of action for 
fraudulent misrepresentation based on common law 
principles"). Notably, we reserved judgment on whether the 
plaintiffs had stated a claim under state law upon which 
relief could be granted. See id. at 829. 
 
Although plaintiffs concede the District Court here"did 
not explicitly invoke preemption principles," they claim that 
"its decision was plainly based on a construction of 
legislative intent." (Appellants' Br. at 31 n.21.) They argue 
Medtronic and Bone Screw I stand for the proposition that 
Congress did not intend to foreclose state law remedies 
based on violations of federal medical device law, and the 
District Court therefore erred in dismissing claims based on 
conspiracy to violate the FDCA. Medtronic and Bone Screw 
I are crucially different from this case, however. Both raised 
the issue whether state common law claims were 
preempted by the FDCA and Medical Device Amendments. 
After Medtronic, it is clear that such claims survive, and 
Bone Screw I so held. Consequently, state law claims such 
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as negligence, breach of implied warranty, and fraudulent 
misrepresentation are viable, even to the extent they seek 
recovery for conduct that may also have violated the FDCA. 
But neither Medtronic nor Bone Screw I  purports to allow 
private plaintiffs to sue directly for violations of a federal 
statute in the absence of a separate underlying cause of 
action. They merely hold that such causes of action as 
previously existed under state law were not preempted by 
the FDCA and Medical Device Amendments. 
 
We will therefore uphold the District Court's dismissal of 
the conspiracy and concert of action claims alleging a 
conspiracy to violate the FDCA. 
 
B. First Amendment Protection 
 
The District Court also denied defendants' motions to 
dismiss the conspiracy and concert of action claims on 
First Amendment grounds. These claims are based largely 
upon the allegation that defendants conspired to commit 
fraud by actively concealing material facts at the seminars. 
Allegedly, speakers at the seminars failed to disclose that 
they had a direct financial stake in the use of the devices, 
that the devices had not yet been approved by the FDA, and 
that testing had raised concerns about their safety. 
According to defendants, imposition of liability for their 
speech at the seminars would violate their First 
Amendment rights. 
 
The First Amendment's prohibition on abridging the 
freedom of speech applies to the states through the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Duncan 
v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148 (1968). Imposition of civil 
liability, such as the award of money damages, is treated 
no less stringently than direct regulation on speech: "The 
fear of damage awards . . . may be markedly more 
inhibiting than the fear of prosecution under a criminal 
statute." New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 
279-280 (1964); see also Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 
U.S. 663, 676 n.4 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("[W]e 
have long held that the imposition of civil liability based on 
protected expression constitutes `punishment' of speech for 
First Amendment purposes."). 
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The Supreme Court has long recognized a " `common- 
sense distinction between speech proposing a commercial 
transaction, which occurs in an area traditionally subject to 
government regulation, and other varieties of speech.' " 
Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 65 (1983) 
(quoting Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 
455-56 (1978)). Commercial speech is accorded a lesser 
degree of First Amendment protection than other kinds of 
speech. For instance, the government may enact content- 
based restrictions on false or misleading commercial 
messages. See, e.g., Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. 
Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 562-63 (1980) 
("[T]here can be no constitutional objection to the 
suppression of commercial messages that do not accurately 
inform the public about lawful activity. The government 
may ban forms of communication more likely to deceive the 
public than to inform it . . . ."); Virginia State Bd. of 
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 
U.S. 748, 771-72 n.24 (1976). In addition, "the First 
Amendment does not protect commercial speech about 
unlawful activities." 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 
517 U.S. 484, 497 n.7 (1996); accord Pittsburgh Press Co. 
v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 
(1973) (same). Thus, an issue of primary significance here 
is whether defendants' speech at the seminars was 
commercial speech, and if so whether it was false and 
misleading, or concerned unlawful activities. 
 
Commercial speech is "broadly defined as expression 
related to the economic interests of the speaker and its 
audience, generally in the form of a commercial 
advertisement for the sale of goods and services." U.S. 
Healthcare, Inc. v. Blue Cross of Greater Phila., 898 F.2d 
914, 933 (3d. Cir. 1990) (citing Bolger, 463 U.S. at 66-67; 
Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 561). In deciding whether 
speech is commercial, we consider the following factors: "(1) 
is the speech an advertisement; (2) does the speech refer to 
a specific product or service; and (3) does the speaker have 
an economic motivation for the speech. An affirmative 
answer to all three questions provides `strong support' for 
the conclusion that the speech is commercial." U.S. 
Healthcare, 898 F.2d at 933 (citation omitted). At the same 
time, we must be mindful of the "difficulty of drawing bright 
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lines that will clearly cabin commercial speech in a distinct 
category." City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 
U.S. 410, 419 (1993). Often, speech consists of"complex 
mixtures of commercial and noncommercial elements." 
Bolger, 463 U.S. at 81 (Stevens, J., concurring). Where the 
commercial and noncommercial elements of speech are 
"inextricably intertwined," the court must apply the "test for 
fully protected expression." Riley v. National Fed'n of the 
Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 796 (1988). 
 
At this stage in the proceedings, it is difficult to 
determine precisely what portion of the seminars, if any, 
consisted of a sales pitch to the attendees and what portion 
was non-commercial medical discussion. The defendants 
characterize the seminars as teaching events aimed at 
promoting "continuing medical education" and accordingly 
contend that the speech is entitled to the highest level of 
First Amendment protection. Plaintiffs, on the other hand, 
liken the seminars to medical "Tupperware parties" at 
which defendants' sole objective was to generate sales of 
their products. 
 
We believe there is a sufficient factual dispute about the 
nature of the seminars to preclude granting defendants' 
motion to dismiss on First Amendment grounds. The 
amended omni complaints allege, inter alia, that the 
seminars were organized by sales representatives employed 
by the participating manufacturers; that these 
representatives invited spinal surgeons to attend and later 
followed up with phone calls in an effort to generate sales; 
that employees of the manufacturers staffed sales booths 
and distributed videotapes, product catalogues, and other 
literature at the seminars; and that the speakers at the 
seminars were doctors and scientists who had entered into 
lucrative royalty agreements giving them a direct financial 
stake in the sales of bone screw devices. If true, these 
allegations would provide strong support for characterizing 
the seminars as commercial speech. 
 
Defendants argue that even if their speech at the 
seminars was commercial in nature (which they deny), it 
constitutes "truthful, nonmisleading speech about a lawful 
product" and therefore is protected. 44 Liquormart, 517 
U.S. at 504; see also Greater New Orleans Broadcasting 
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Ass'n v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 119 S. Ct. 1923 (1999) 
(holding that a state may not ban nonmisleading 
advertisements of legal gambling). Plaintiffs respond that 
the speech at the seminars was highly misleading and 
deceptive. The amended omni complaints allege defendants 
knowingly withheld material facts at the seminars and 
falsely represented to the physicians in attendance that the 
devices were safe and effective for use in pedicle screw 
fixation surgery. 
 
Clearly, there is a considerable and unresolved factual 
dispute regarding key elements of the speech at issue. In 
order to dismiss the claims on First Amendment grounds, 
we would have to determine either that defendants' speech 
at the seminars was noncommercial in nature, or that it 
was truthful or nonmisleading commercial speech 
concerning a lawful product. In view of our obligation to 
accept as true the factual allegations of the nonmoving 
party, we are unwilling to do either at this point. Whether 
the allegations in the omni complaints are true remains to 
be determined. But dismissal is warranted only if"it 
appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of 
facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to 
relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). We do 
not believe this standard has been met; therefore, we will 
uphold the District Court's denial of defendants' motions to 
dismiss. Of course, defendants are free to raise their First 
Amendment argument in the transferor courts after the 
factual record is more fully developed. 
 
C. Plaintiffs' Theory of Damages 
 
Defendants North American Spine Society, American 
Academy of Orthopedic Surgeons, and Scoliosis Research 
Society (collectively "the medical associations") submitted a 
joint brief in which they argue that plaintiffs' claims should 
be dismissed for failure to plead causation adequately. In 
particular, they contend plaintiffs have not properly alleged 
a causal connection between the seminars and the 
decisions of individual physicians to use the bone screw 
devices in surgery. They argue that in order to allege 
proximate cause adequately, each plaintiff must 
demonstrate that his or her surgeon relied upon 
defendants' statements at the seminars in making the 
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decision to use the devices for pedicle fixation surgery, and 
that this decision in turn caused the injury upon which 
relief is sought. Plaintiffs' theory of causation, they claim, 
eschews proof of individualized reliance in favor of an 
unjustified extension of the "fraud-on-the-market-theory" of 
liability developed in securities law. See Basic Inc. v. 
Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988).10 For their part, plaintiffs 
claim their market theory of causation extended only to the 
fraud aspect of their conspiracy claims, which they have 
now discontinued, and they also dispute that they are 
required to prove individualized causation. They argue it is 
sufficient to show that the seminars contributed to the 
creation of an unlawful black market for pedicle screw 
fixation devices, in the absence of which plaintiffs would 
not have been injured. 
 
We believe these issues are best resolved under a plenary 
standard in the transferor courts, rather than on the appeal 
of a motion to dismiss. Whether plaintiffs have adequately 
alleged causation depends greatly on the particulars of the 
state law governing each claim. This fact alone counsels 
against dismissing all claims on this basis. See Bone Screw 
I, 159 F.3d at 826 ("While we are not in a position to 
canvass all the potentially applicable law [of the transferor 
jurisdictions], what we know about tort law generally 
makes us unwilling to say that all of the plaintiffs' claims 
will fail for want of the kind of a causation that will give rise 
to liability."). There is no uniform rule governing the level of 
specificity with which proximate cause must be proven in 
the various jurisdictions involved in this litigation. 
Moreover, many jurisdictions have adopted a "substantial 
factor" test that does not lend itself to facile predictions 
about which theories of damages will suffice. See, e.g., 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. As noted, the medical associations previouslyfiled a petition for a 
writ of mandamus invalidating plaintiffs' fraud-on-the-market theory as 
a matter of law. In denying the writ, we observed that plaintiffs had 
represented to the Court that they planned to assemble evidence of 
individualized reliance through the discovery process, and that they 
would rely on a fraud-on-the-market theory only in those cases where 
reliance could not be proven. See In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Prods. 
Liability Litig., MDL No. 1014, mem. op. at 8-9 (3d Cir. Nov. 10, 1997) 
(unpublished opinion). 
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Parks v. AlliedSignal, Inc., 113 F.3d 1327, 1332 (3d Cir. 
1997) ("When addressing causation, Pennsylvania has 
rejected the `but for' test and adopted the `substantial 
factor' test . . . ."); Dawson v. Bunker Hill Plaza Assocs., 
673 A.2d 847, 853 (N.J. Super Ct. App. Div. 1996) 
("Liability attaches not only to the dominating cause but 
also to any cause which constitutes at any event a 
substantial factor in bringing about the injury.") (internal 
quotation marks omitted); Abrahams v. Young & Rubicam, 
Inc., 692 A.2d 709, 712 (Conn. 1997) ("[I]t is axiomatic that 
proximate cause is an actual cause that is a substantial 
factor in the resulting harm.") (internal quotation marks 
omitted); State v. Hubka, 480 N.W.2d 867, 869 (Iowa 1992) 
("The general rule is that a defendant's conduct is the 
proximate cause of injury or death to another if (1) her 
conduct is a `substantial factor' in bringing about the harm 
and (2) there is no other rule of law relieving the defendant 
of liability because of the manner in which her conduct 
resulted in the harm."). 
 
We believe the transferor courts are in the best position 
to determine whether the applicable state law permits 
plaintiffs to recover damages without proving individual 
reliance. Accordingly, we decline to dismiss plaintiffs' 
claims on this basis. 
 
D. Costs and Sanctions 
 
The medical associations filed cross-motions for costs 
and sanctions under 28 U.S.C. S 1927, Fed. R. Civ. P. 
54(d), and the court's inherent judicial powers. In support, 
they argued that plaintiffs acted in bad faith and needlessly 
multiplied the litigation by bringing the conspiracy to 
defraud claim despite having no means of proving 
individualized reliance. The District Court denied these 
motions, finding that defendants had not demonstrated 
"willful bad faith" on the part of the plaintiffs. See In re 
Orthopedic Bone Screw Prods. Liability Litig., MDL 1014, 
Memorandum and Pretrial Order No. 1543, op. at 8-9 (E.D. 
Pa. Aug. 13, 1998) ("PTO 1543"). 
 
We review the denial of attorney's fees and costs for 
abuse of discretion. See Gioioso v. Stuebben, 979 F.2d 956, 
959 (3d Cir. 1992). Such an abuse occurs when the court's 
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decision " `rests upon a clearly erroneousfinding of fact, an 
errant conclusion of law or an improper application of law 
to fact.' " Morgan v. Perry, 142 F.3d 670, 682 (3d Cir. 1998) 
(quoting Hanover Potato Prods., Inc. v. Shalala, 989 F.2d 
123, 127 (3d Cir. 1993)). 
 
Imposition of attorney's fees and costs under section 
1927 is reserved for behavior " `of an egregious nature, 
stamped by bad faith that is violative of recognized 
standards in the conduct of litigation.' " Baker Indus., Inc. 
v. Cerberus Ltd., 764 F.2d 204, 208 (3d Cir. 1985) (quoting 
Colucci v. New York Times Co., 533 F. Supp. 1011, 1014 
(S.D.N.Y. 1982)). Thus, fees may not be awarded unless 
there is "a finding of willful bad faith on the part of the 
offending attorney." Baker, 764 F.2d at 209. An award of 
fees under the court's inherent powers requires a similar 
finding. See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 45-46 
(1991) (court may assess fees under inherent powers when 
a party has acted " `in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or 
for oppressive reasons' ") (quoting Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. 
v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 258-59 (1975)). 
 
We agree with the District Court that no finding of bad 
faith was warranted here. As noted, several of plaintiffs' 
claims were premised upon a theory of damages that 
defendants characterize as a "fraud-on-the-market" theory. 
They contend this theory is so lacking in merit that it 
should never have been advanced, and that plaintiffs' 
reliance on it needlessly multiplied the proceedings and 
incurred wasteful expense. Regardless of whether plaintiffs' 
theory of causation is ultimately accepted by transferor 
courts, we cannot say the plaintiffs acted in bad faith in 
raising it. The Supreme Court has specifically instructed 
that courts should be wary of chilling legitimate advocacy 
by imposing fees too hastily: "[I]t is important that a district 
court resist the understandable temptation to engage in 
post hoc reasoning by concluding that, because a plaintiff 
did not prevail, his action must have been unreasonable or 
without foundation. This kind of hindsight logic could 
discourage all but the most airtight claims . . . ." 
Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421-22 
(1978); accord Baker, 764 F.2d at 208 (bad-faith 
requirement is "necessary to avoid chilling an attorney's 
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legitimate obligation to represent his client zealously"). 
Restraint is particularly important where, as here, the case 
presents complex factual and legal issues. See In re 
Kunstler, 914 F.2d 505, 523 (4th Cir. 1990) (sanctioning 
powers should be exercised with restraint to avoid chilling 
"novel factual or legal theories"); Barney v. Holzer Clinic, 
Ltd., 110 F.3d 1207, 1213 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding that an 
award of fees under section 1927 was not warranted where 
the "central issue was one of first impression"); United 
States v. Alexander, 981 F.2d 250, 253 (5th Cir. 1993) 
(vacating an assessment of sanctions because of"the 
absence of authority in this Circuit combined with the 
complexity of the issue"). 
 
Additionally, we believe the history of this litigation 
undermines any claim that plaintiffs acted in "actual" or 
"willful" bad faith, as required for an award of fees under 
section 1927. Baker, 764 F.2d at 208-09. Early in 
consolidated pretrial proceedings, the District Court raised 
the issue whether the original omni complaints satisfied the 
requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, which provides for the 
imposition of sanctions upon attorneys who submit 
complaints lacking a sufficient legal and factual basis. In 
response, plaintiffs submitted a 750-page Particularized 
Statement of Facts accompanied by numerous exhibits, 
explicating in more detail their claims for relief. The District 
Court then determined that the complaints did not violate 
Rule 11 but still were not pleaded with sufficient 
particularity, and granted plaintiffs' leave to replead. See In 
re Orthopedic Bone Screw Prods. Liability Litig., MDL No. 
1014, Pretrial Order No. 477 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 22, 1996). In 
response, the PLC developed amended "form" complaints 
that were expressly authorized by the District Court before 
being transmitted to the various plaintiffs' attorneys, who 
modified them as necessary to suit the particulars of their 
clients' cases. Although this history is not dispositive, we 
believe it strongly supports the District Court's 
determination that plaintiffs' counsel did not act in bad 
faith; to the contrary, they responded to the court's request 
to cure potential defects in the complaints before 
proceeding further. 
 
Finally, we also note that defendants' principal argument 
for imposing costs -- namely, that plaintiffs cannot prove 
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that defendants' conduct at the seminars was the 
proximate cause of their injuries -- is largely a question of 
fact which remains unresolved. Plaintiffs still contend that 
individual reliance can be proven in many cases, and we 
will not second-guess this representation on the appeal of 
a motion for attorney's fees. As the District Court aptly 
observed, "If this court imposed sanctions for prosecuting 
these claims the court would implicitly engage in fact 
finding that is typically reserved for a jury." PTO 1543, at 
10. We therefore see no abuse of discretion in the court's 





We hold that the District Court properly dismissed 
plaintiffs' conspiracy and concert of action claims based on 
violations of the FDCA, because these claims failed to state 
a claim upon which relief can be granted. We alsofind no 
error in the District Court's denial of defendants' motions to 
dismiss. At this stage in the proceedings, it would be 
premature to conclude that even if plaintiffs' allegations are 
true, defendants' speech at the seminars could not possibly 
form the basis of civil liability under the First Amendment. 
Similarly, we do not believe plaintiffs' theory of damages is 
so devoid of legal support in all jurisdictions that it can be 
dismissed outright in consolidated pretrial proceedings. 
Defendants, of course, are free to challenge its legal viability 
in the transferor courts. We will also uphold the denial of 
the medical associations' motions for attorney's fees and 
costs. 
 
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District 
Court. 
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